Two men are placed at the scene of a homicide. Each has an unsavory past and either could be the murderer-or an innocent man. It all depends on whether a witness should be believed, how the evidence is pieced together, and how the prosecutor decides to proceed. Should he try one man and set the other free? If the first prosecution fails, will he then try the second man? Can he try them simultaneously?
prosecutor has not manipulated the evidence in order to pursue multiple trials. Part I introduces the debate in the lower courts and sets out the controversy. Part II then offers a model that challenges the reliability claim.
i. existing approaches for inconsistent prosecutions
Courts across the country have entertained arguments that it is unconstitutional for a prosecutor to conduct multiple trials with contradictory theories of a single crime. 5 Although there is no single approach for evaluating these claims, reliability is a frequent theme. 6 This appeal to reliability appears to be an outgrowth of Supreme Court decisions on prosecutorial misconduct that proscribe the presentation of testimony prosecutors know to be false 7 and require prosecutors to correct testimony they elicit that would mislead the jury. 8 Commentators 9 and litigants 10 have extended this reasoning to deduce that if the state pursues two defendants under mutually exclusive factual theories, the state must have educed false testimony in one of the trials, even if the state does not know which. Accordingly, the government must be increasing the risk that an innocent person will be convicted. This line of reasoning, while initially appealing, ultimately proves misguided when subjected to a fairly simple probabilistic analysis.
11 As some courts have already realized, in evaluating the risk to the innocent, a distinction should be drawn between multiple prosecutions that involve unethical conduct and those that arise from a prosecutor's good faith uncertainty.
When defendants prevail on reliability claims, it is often due to blatant prosecutorial misconduct in the dual prosecution. Courts sensing that
5.
See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra notes 13-14, 19-20 and accompanying text.
7.
See Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 84-89 (1935); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) ; see also Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236 , 1240 (9th Cir. 2000 ("It follows [from Berger and Mooney] that a prosecutor's pursuit of fundamentally inconsistent theories in separate trials against separate defendants charged with the same murder can violate due process if the prosecutor knowingly uses false evidence or acts in bad faith.").
8.
See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ; see also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 , 1049 (8th Cir. 2000 (citing Napue in a dual-prosecution setting).
9.
See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1423 , 1461 -63 (2001 REV. 525, 543-46 (1999). prosecutors are out to win at any cost have vacated convictions in several federal and state jurisdictions.
12 These courts have gestured toward reliability concerns in their judgments. For example, when the Eighth Circuit condemned a prosecutor's extraction of two conflicting stories from a single witness before either trial began in order to use the more convenient story in each subsequent trial, the panel concluded that "the state's error rendered unreliable" the conviction under review. 13 The California Supreme Court similarly wrote that when a "change in theories between the two trials is achieved partly through deliberate manipulation of the evidence put before the jury, the use of such inconsistent and irreconcilable theories impermissibly undermines the reliability of the convictions or sentences thereby obtained." 14 In both of these cases, the findings of bad faith were central to the outcomes.
When prosecutors' decisions to undertake dual prosecutions appear to stem from good faith uncertainty, however, courts are divided. The two extremes are set out by the Fifth Circuit in Nichols v. Scott 15 and the Sixth Circuit in Bradshaw v. Stumpf. 16 In Nichols, two men admitted to firing bullets at a victim who died from a single gunshot wound. Both men were convicted and sentenced to death under the mutually exclusive factual conclusions that each man fired the fatal shot. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the trials should be evaluated independently and that nothing in the first trial affected the reliability of the second.
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In the Sixth Circuit, John Stumpf pleaded guilty to aggravated murder but argued during the mitigation hearing that his accomplice fired the fatal shot. The state argued otherwise and Stumpf was sentenced to death. A few months later, Stumpf's accomplice, Clyde Wesley, was tried by the same prosecutor, who then argued that Wesley was the gunman. Because a jailhouse snitch had 12. See, e.g., Groose, 205 F.3d at 1047-48; Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 , 1059 (9th Cir. 1997 So, what should be done in cases like Nichols and Stumpf? Intuitively, the reliability argument is effective. The justice system should strive not to subject innocent persons to trials for capital murder. But a contrary position may be equally convincing: If the prosecutor does not know who is guilty, shouldn't the decision lie with a jury? Why force a prosecutor either to sacrifice a conviction in hand or to abandon a new lead? This Comment offers a quantitative rationale for avoiding this dilemma in favor of inconsistent prosecutions.
ii. a probabilistic evaluation of dual prosecutions
The notion of reliability is naturally tied to probability and statistics. This Part presents a brief model to assess the reliability of various possible rules for inconsistent prosecutions. Incorporating conviction-hungry prosecutors and error-prone juries, the model demonstrates that so long as juries make some positive contribution to the truth-seeking process, dual prosecutions will result in fewer wrongful convictions than the alternatives.
Consider a circumstance not unlike the premise of Stumpf. A crime has been committed by one of two suspects. The prosecutor legitimately does not know who is guilty, but there is probable cause to indict either or both. Indicting both suspects would require the prosecutor to tell a different story of the crime in each trial. If this were a minor crime, perhaps the prosecutor would leave the case unsolved, but there is strong pressure on the prosecutor to secure a conviction. What rule for inconsistent prosecutorial theories First, a rule of judicial estoppel says that once a prosecutor makes an argument that a court accepts-i.e., once one person has been convicted-she may not pursue a contrary theory. 22 Under this rule, a conviction-seeking prosecutor would randomly select which of the two suspects to try first. If the first trial results in an acquittal, the second defendant would be tried. But if the first trial results in a conviction, this rule's incentives would lead the prosecutor to stop pursuing the second suspect lest she jeopardize the original conviction.
A second rule provides for offsetting convictions. A prosecutor would be free to pursue inconsistent theories simultaneously, but the rule requires both convictions to be vacated if both defendants are convicted.
23 Offsetting convictions would act like mistrials, and the state could then try the defendants again.
The 853, 865-66, 905-06 (2002) . No court has adopted this extreme approach, and it seems unworkable to force prosecutors to make decisions knowing that future discoveries would be forever lost to the justice system. Accordingly, I do not consider this approach. courtroom has no bearing on what happens in another. Thus, even two factually inconsistent death sentences would be permitted. The Nichols framework results in the greatest possibility that somebody will be convicted but offers no safeguards against wrongful convictions. A rule of judicial estoppel would result in the fewest trials, because if the (randomly chosen) first defendant were convicted, there would be no second trial. The goal, however, is to minimize the probability that the innocent man will be convicted.
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To figure out which rule convicts the innocent suspect least frequently, we can model the problem as the interaction of type-I and type-II errors.
26 Assume that the trials are conducted independently and that, when the innocent man is tried, the jury wrongfully convicts with probability α. Similarly, in trials of the factually guilty man, the jury errs and acquits with probability β. Incorporating the rational course of action for a prosecutor seeking convictions, the conviction probabilities can be computed for the right and wrong suspects, under each of the three policy options, as functions of α and β.
With a rule of judicial estoppel, under which the prosecutor has incentives to randomly select one of the suspects to try, there are two ways to wrongfully convict the innocent man: either he is tried first (which happens with probability 0.5) and convicted; or the guilty man is tried first (with probability 0.5), he is acquitted, and the wrong man is then tried and convicted. So, the total probability of a wrongful conviction is 0.5α + 0.5αβ. Under the Nichols rule, the innocent man is convicted with probability α regardless of what happens in the guilty man's trial. And, with offsetting convictions, the innocent man is convicted in the first trial with probability α, but the conviction stands only if the jury trying the guilty man also errs and acquits, a phenomenon with total probability αβ. When both juries convict, with probability α(1 -β), the convictions are nullified and the prosecutor continues trying both men. The overall error rate is given in Table 1. 25. To be sure, there are real costs to being subjected to a criminal trial, even for defendants who are ultimately acquitted. These costs should play into the decision whether to allow dual prosecutions, reliability notwithstanding.
26.
In statistics, it is type-I error to reject a hypothesis when it is true. Conversely, it is type-II error to accept the hypothesis when it is false. Here, because criminal trials begin with a null hypothesis that the defendant is innocent, type-I error means convicting the innocent while type-II error means acquitting the guilty. 
By way of example, suppose in these close cases that juries would wrongly convict the innocent defendant twenty percent of the time (α = 0.2) while correctly convicting the guilty defendant seventy percent of the time (β = 0.3). 27 As Table 2 indicates, a judicial rule providing only for offsetting convictions would achieve the correct result 28 the most often (65%) while wrongfully convicting the innocent man least often (7%). These results are symptomatic of the flaws of the other approaches: Judicial estoppel provides stronger disincentives for the state to continue investigating once it gets a conviction, and both judicial estoppel and the Nichols approach sacrifice the error-catching opportunities of parallel trials. If dual convictions offset, the wrong suspect is convicted only when both juries misjudge.
27.
The true values of α and β are not known, so 0.2 and 0.3 are merely demonstrative. The value of β was adapted from Neil Vidmar et al., Should We Rush To Reform the Criminal Jury?: Consider Conviction Rate Data, 80 JUDICATURE 286 (1997) , which found jury conviction rates varying from 58.9% to 86.1% across different jurisdictions and crimes.
28. The correct result is both convicting the guilty defendant and not convicting the innocent defendant.
This simple analysis yields a much broader result: For all plausible jury error rates, a rule of offsetting convictions, which permits inconsistent prosecutions, most reliably protects the innocent. Figure 1 shows how the three policies considered in this Comment compare. The two axes represent the probability that a jury convicts the innocent and the probability that a jury convicts the guilty. The curve indicates where the policies of offsetting convictions and judicial estoppel have identical error rates. For all points in the shaded region, offsetting convictions result in the fewest wrongful convictions. For points below the curve, judicial estoppel is best. Notably, from the standpoint of protecting the innocent, the Nichols approach is never optimal. optimal policy as a function of type-i and type-ii errors But the (α, 1 -β) combinations plotted in Figure 1 are not equally likely to occur. The rule providing for offsetting convictions is always optimal in the range defined by reasonable assumptions about jury accuracy. The dotted line in Figure 1 represents a jury that has no ability to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty and convicts either with equal probability. For all points above the dotted line (i.e., wherever 1 -β exceeds α), the jury convicts the guilty man more often than the innocent man and thereby adds value to the process. And whenever 1 -β is greater than α, the best policy is offsetting convictions. If juries have any capacity to distinguish between innocence and guilt, then the use of inconsistent prosecutorial theories actually enhances reliability.
conclusion
If a prosecutor is genuinely torn between two suspects, then letting separate juries decide which defendant is guilty is more reliable than forcing the prosecutor to choose only one suspect to try. To be sure, this Comment should not be misconstrued as advocating the frequent use of multiple trials. It should be a rare situation in which two suspects seem equally likely to be guilty. And as a prosecutor becomes more certain as to which suspect is guilty, the reliability concerns of dual prosecutions escalate while the benefits subside.
The motivating force behind this Comment is that our due process jurisprudence should not provide incentives for prosecutors to make unilateral judgments that displace the time-tested role of juries. While prosecutorial attempts to manipulate evidence in the pursuit of multiple prosecutions do render trials unreliable, courts should not blindly extend the label of unreliability to cases, like Stumpf, in which the prosecutors appear to have acted ethically. As this analysis shows, using the adversarial process to ferret out the truth legitimately protects the rights of the falsely accused.
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